Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?

❌ Objection 1 : It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above (Question [15], Article [1]): whereas the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason.

❌ Objection 2 : Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7). [*'Rationes aeternae,' cf. FP, Question [15], Articles [2],[3] where as in similar passages 'ratio' has been rendered by the English 'type,' because St. Thomas was speaking of the Divine 'idea' as the archetype of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal law, (cf. Article [8], Objection [1]; Article [9])]. But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason.

❌ Objection 3 : Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.

❌ Objection 4 : Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason.