Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, viz. commutative and distributive?

❌ Objection 1 : It would seem that the two species of justice are unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many, both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and because the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. ii, 15): "He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to expect that he will receive again." Therefore distribution does not belong to any species of justice.

❌ Objection 2 : Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is his own, as stated above (Question [58], Article [2]). But when things are distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes possessed of something which belonged to the community. Therefore this does not pertain to justice.

❌ Objection 3 : Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in the subject, as stated above (Question [58], Article [6]). But it belongs exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution does not always belong to justice.

❌ Objection 4 : Further, "Distributive justice regards common goods" (Ethic. v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice. Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of legal justice.

❌ Objection 5 : Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to one person, while distributive justice consists in giving something to many. Therefore they are not different species of justice.