Whether justice is about the passions?

❌ Objection 1 : It would seem that justice is about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about pleasure and pain." Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions, as stated above [*FS, Question [23], Article [4]; FS, Question [31], Article [1]; FS, Question [35], Article [1]] when we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a moral virtue, is about the passions.

❌ Objection 2 : Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations cannot be rectified unless the passions be rectified, because it is owing to disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the aforesaid operations: thus sexual lust leads to adultery, and overmuch love of money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs be about the passions.

❌ Objection 3 : Further, even as particular justice is towards another person so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, else it would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently about the passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.