Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence?

❌ Objection 1 : It would seem that the gift of counsel does not fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest point of that which is underneath touches that which is above," as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact with the angel in respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to the gifts, as stated above (FS, Question [68], Article [8]). Since, then, counsel is the first and lowest act of prudence, while command is its highest act, and judgment comes between, it seems that the gift corresponding to prudence is not counsel, but rather a gift of judgment or command.

❌ Objection 2 : Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the higher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in De Causis. Now prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only speculative but also practical, as shown above (Question [9], Article [3]). Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.

❌ Objection 3 : Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as stated above (Question [47], Article [8]). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that man should be directed by God, as stated above (Article [1]). Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.