Whether foresight* should be accounted a part of prudence? [*"Providentia," which may be translated either "providence" or "foresight."]
Objections
❌ Objection 1 : It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems to be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a prudent man is one who sees from afar [porro videns]": and this is also the derivation of "providentia [foresight]," according to Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.
❌ Objection 2 : Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be also speculative, because "seeing," whence we have the word "to foresee," has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.
❌ Objection 3 : Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not part of prudence.