Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?

❌ Objection 1 : It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of temperance.

❌ Objection 2 : Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as stated above (Question [141], Article [4]). Therefore mildness is not a part of temperance.

❌ Objection 3 : Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Now external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (Question [58], Article [8]). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.

❌ Objection 4 : Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty, shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness, sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity, refinement, method, contentment." [*'Per-se-sufficientiam' which could be rendered 'self-sufficiency,' but for the fact that this is taken in a bad sense. See Question [169], Article [1].] Therefore it seems that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.