Whether the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts?

❌ Objection 1 : It would seem that the gift of understanding is not distinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between things whose opposites are not distinct. Now "wisdom is contrary to folly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to rashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance," as Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference between folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does understanding differ from the other gifts.

❌ Objection 2 : Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs from the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be about self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not about any self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first principles suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally self-evident: while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as are supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first principles in supernatural knowledge, as stated above (Question [1], Article [7]). Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other intellectual gifts.

❌ Objection 3 : Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as stated above (Article [3]). Therefore it is not distinct from the other intellectual gifts, but comprises them all.