Whether hope is in the will as its subject?

❌ Objection 1 : It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above (Question [17], Article [1]; FS, Question [40], Article [1]). Now the arduous is the object, not of the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in the irascible.

❌ Objection 2 : Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.

❌ Objection 3 : Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so that, therefore, hope is not in the will.