Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?

Objections

Objection 1 : It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (Question [23], Article [4]; Question [31], Article [1]; Question [35], Articles [1], 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.
Objection 2 : Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above (Question [22], Article [3]). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions.
Objection 3 : Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.