Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?

❌ Objection 1 : It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety." Because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil." Therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above (Question [35], Article [8]). Therefore there should only be four species of fear corresponding to them.

❌ Objection 2 : Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, as stated above (Article [2]). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear.

❌ Objection 3 : Further, fear is of the future, as stated above (Articles [1], 2). But "shame regards a disgraceful deed already done," as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore shame is not a species of fear.

❌ Objection 4 : Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore amazement and stupor are not species of fear.

❌ Objection 5 : Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads to flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of fear.