Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object?

❌ Objection 1 : It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to movable, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. But a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be moved of necessity by its object.

❌ Objection 2 : Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as stated above (Article [1], ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity, by its object: therefore the will also, by its object.

❌ Objection 3 : Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end necessarily: because it is like the principle in speculative matters, to which principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason for willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object.