Whether the will desires something of necessity?

❌ Objection 1 : It would seem that the will desires nothing. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity.

❌ Objection 2 : Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), "the will is in the reason." Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity.

❌ Objection 3 : Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act of the will cannot be necessitated.