Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul?

❌ Objection 1 : It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since "all desire good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite is not a special power of the soul.

❌ Objection 2 : Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from the apprehensive power.

❌ Objection 3 : Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing---namely its own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is the desirable in general, we should not assign some particular power distinct from the others, called the appetitive power.